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Abstract. This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash
equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-
player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a
recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed that there exists a small con-
stant ǫ, such that it is PPAD-complete to find an (unconstrained) ǫ-Nash
equilibrium of a polymatrix game. In the first part of the paper, we show
that is NP-hard to decide if a polymatrix game has a constrained approx-
imate equilibrium for 9 natural constraints and any non-trivial approxi-
mation guarantee. These results hold even for planar bipartite polyma-
trix games with degree 3 and at most 7 strategies per player, and all
non-trivial approximation guarantees. These results stand in contrast to
similar results for bimatrix games, which obviously need a non-constant
number of actions, and which rely on stronger complexity-theoretic con-
jectures such as the exponential time hypothesis. In the second part,
we provide a deterministic QPTAS for interaction graphs with bounded
treewidth and with logarithmically many actions per player that can
compute constrained approximate equilibria for a wide family of con-
straints that cover many of the constraints dealt with in the first part.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study polymatrix games, which provide a succinct representation
of a many-player game. In these games, each player is a vertex in a graph, and
each edge of the graph is a bimatrix game. Every player chooses a single strategy
and plays it in all of the bimatrix games that he is involved in, and his payoff is
the sum of the payoffs that he obtains from each individual edge game.
A fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory is to design efficient
algorithms for computing Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, even in bimatrix games,
this is PPAD-complete [10,15], which probably rules out efficient algorithms. Thus,
attention has shifted to approximate equilibria. There are two natural notions
of an approximate equilibrium. An ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE) requires that each
player has an expected payoff that is within ǫ of their best response payoff. An
ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) requires that all players only play
pure strategies whose payoff is within ǫ of the best response payoff.
Constrained approximate equilibria. Sometimes, it is not enough to find
an approximate NE, but instead we want to find one that satisfies certain con-
straints, such as having high social welfare. For bimatrix games, the algorithm
of Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta (henceforth LMM) can be adapted to provide
a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) for this task [27]: we
can find in mO(
lnm
ǫ2
) time an ǫ-NE whose social welfare is at least as good as any
ǫ′-NE where ǫ′ < ǫ.
A sequence of papers [1,9,19,24] has shown that polynomial time algorithms
for finding ǫ-NEs with good social welfare are unlikely to exist, subject to various
hardness assumptions such as ETH. These hardness results carry over to a range
of other properties, and apply for all ǫ < 18 [19].
Our contribution. We show that deciding whether there is an ǫ-NE with good
social welfare in a polymatrix game is NP-complete for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. We then study
a variety of further constraints (Table 1). For each one, we show that deciding
whether there is an ǫ-WSNE that satisfies the constraint is NP-complete for all
ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Our results hold even when the game is a planar bipartite graph with
degree at most 3, where each player has at most 7 actions.
To put these results into context, let us contrast them with the known lower
bounds for bimatrix games, which also apply directly to polymatrix games. Those
results [1,9,19,24] imply that one cannot hope to find an algorithm that is better
than a QPTAS for polymatrix games when ǫ < 18 . In comparison, our results
show a stronger NP-hardness result, apply to all ǫ in the range (0, 1), and hold
even when the players have constantly many actions.
We then study the problem of computing constrained approximate equilibria
in polymatrix games with restricted graphs. Although our hardness results apply
to a broad class of graphs, bounded treewidth graphs do not fall within their
scope. A recent result of Ortiz and Irfan [29] has provided a QPTAS for finding
ǫ-NEs in polymatrix games with bounded treewidth where every player has at
most logarithmically many actions. We devise a dynamic programming algorithm
for finding approximate equilibria in polymatrix games with bounded treewidth.
Much like the algorithm in [29], we discretize both the strategy and payoff spaces,
and obtain a complexity result that matches theirs. However, our algorithm
works directly on the game, avoiding the reduction to a CSP used in their result.
The main benefit is that this algorithm can be adapted to provide a QPTAS
for constrained approximate Nash equilibria. We introduce one variable decom-
posable (OVD) constraints, which are a broad class of optimization constraints,
including many of the problems listed in Table 1. We show that our algorithm can
be adapted to find good approximate equilibria relative to an OVD constraint.
Initially, we do this for the restricted class of k-uniform strategies: we can find a
k-uniform 1.5ǫ-NE whose value is better than any k-uniform ǫ/4-NE. Note that
this is similar to the guarantee given by the LMM technique in bimatrix games.
We extend this beyond the class of k-uniform strategies for constraints that are
defined by a linear combination of the payoffs, such as social welfare. In this
case, we find a 1.5ǫ-NE whose value is within O(ǫ) of any ǫ/8-NE.
Related work. Barman, Ligett and Piliouras [4] have provided a randomised
QPTAS for polymatrix games played on trees. Their algorithm is also a dynamic
programming algorithm that discretizes the strategy space using the notion of a
k-uniform strategy. Their algorithm is a QPTAS for general polymatrix games
on trees and when the number of pure strategies for every player is bounded by
a constant they get an expected polynomial-time algorithm (EPTAS).
The work of Ortiz and Irfan [29] applies to a much wider class of games that
they call graphical multi-hypermatrix games. They provide a QPTAS for the
case where the interaction hypergraph has bounded hypertreewidth. This class
includes polymatrix games that have bounded treewdith and logarithmically
many actions per player. For the special cases of tree polymatrix games and
tree graphical games they go further and provide explicit dynamic programming
algorithms that work directly on the game, and avoid the need to solve a CSP.
Gilboa and Zemel [23] showed that it is NP-complete to decide whether there
exist Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with some properties, such as high social
welfare. Conitzer and Sandholm [11] extended the list of NP-complete problems
of [23]. Recently, Garg et al. [22] and Bilo and Mavronicolas [5,6] extended these
results to many-player games and provided analogous ETR-completeness results.
Computing approximate equilibria in bimatrix games has been well stud-
ied [8,12,16,17,21,26,31], but there has been less work for polymatrix games [3,
18, 20]. Rubinstein [30] has shown that there is a small constant ǫ such that
finding an ǫ-NE of a polymatrix game is PPAD-complete. For constrained ǫ-NE,
the only positive results were for bimatrix games and gave algorithms for finding
ǫ-NE with constraints on payoffs [13, 14].
2 Preliminaries
We start by fixing some notation. We use [k] to denote the set of integers
{1, 2, . . . , k}, and when a universe [k] is clear, we will use S¯ = {i ∈ [k], i /∈ S} to
denote the complement of S ⊆ [k]. For a k-dimensional vector x, we use x−S to
denote the elements of x with indices S¯, and in the case where S = {i} has only
one element, we simply write x−i for x−S .
An n-player polymatrix game is defined by an undirected graph G = (V,E)
with n vertices, where each vertex is a player. The edges of the graph specify
which players interact with each other. For each i ∈ [n], we use N(i) = {j :
(i, j) ∈ E} to denote the neighbors of player i. Each edge (i, j) ∈ E specifies a
bimatrix game to be played between players i and j. Each player i ∈ [n] has a
fixed number of pure strategies m, so the bimatrix game on edge (i, j) ∈ E is
specified by an m ×m matrix Aij , which gives the payoffs for player i, and an
m×m matrix Aji, which gives the payoffs for player j. We allow the individual
payoffs in each matrix to be an arbitrary rational number. We make the standard
normalisation assumption that the maximum payoff each player can obtain under
any strategy profile is 1 and the minimum is zero, unless specified otherwise.
This can be achieved for example by using the procedure described in [20]. A
subgame of a polymatrix game is obtained by restricting ignoring edges that are
not contained within a given subgraph of the game’s interaction graph G.
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over player i’s pure
strategies. A strategy profile specifies a mixed strategy for every player. Given a
strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn), the pure strategy payoffs, or the payoff vector, of
player i under s, where only s−i is relevant, is the sum of the pure strategy payoffs
that he obtains in each of the bimatrix games that he plays. Formally, we define:
pi(s) :=
∑
j∈N(i)Aijsj . The expected payoff of player i under the strategy profile
Problem description Problem definition
Problem 1: Large total payoff u ∈ (0, n] Is there an ǫ-NE s such that
∑
i∈[n] pi(s) ≥ u?
Problem 2: Small total payoff u ∈ [0, n) Is there an ǫ-WSNE s such that
∑
i∈[n] pi(s) ≤
u?
Problem 3: Small payoff u ∈ [0, 1) Is there an ǫ-WSNE s such that mini pi(s) ≤ u?
Problem 4: Restricted support S ⊂ [n] Is there an ǫ-WSNE s with supp(s1) ⊆ S?
Problem 5: Two ǫ-WSNE d ∈ (0, 1]
apart in Total Variation (TV) distance
Are there two ǫ-WSNE with TV distance ≥ d?
Problem 6: Small largest probability
p ∈ (0, 1)
Is there an ǫ-WSNE s with maxj s1(j) ≤ p?
Problem 7: Large total support size k ∈
[n ·m]
Is there an ǫ-WSNE s such that∑
i∈[n] |supp(si)| ≥ k?
Problem 8: Large smallest support size
k ∈ [n]
Is there an ǫ-WSNE s such that
mini |supp(si)| ≥ k?
Problem 9: Large support size k ∈ [n] Is there an ǫ-WSNE s such that |supp(s1)| ≥ k?
Table 1: The decision problems that we consider. All problems take as input an
n-player polymatrix game with m actions for each player and an ǫ ∈ [0, 1].
s is defined as si · pi(s). The regret of player i under s the is difference between
i’s best response payoff against s−i and between i’s payoff under s. If a strategy
has regret ǫ, we say that the strategy is an ǫ-best response. A strategy profile s
is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, or ǫ-NE, if no player can increase his utility more than
ǫ by unilaterally from s, i.e., if the regret of every player is at most ǫ. Formally,
s is an ǫ-NE if for every player i ∈ [n] it holds that si · pi(s) ≥ maxpi(s) − ǫ.
A strategy profile s is an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, or ǫ-WSNE, if if
the regret of every pure strategy played with positive probability is at most
ǫ. Formally, s is an ǫ-WSNE if for every player i ∈ [n] it holds that for all
j ∈ supp(si) = {k ∈ [m] | (si)k > 0} we have (pi(s))j ≥ maxpi(s)− ǫ.
3 Decision problems for approximate equilibria
In this section, we show NP-completeness for nine decision problems related to
constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games. Table 1 contains
the list of the problems we study3. For Problem 1, we show hardness for all
ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. For the remaining problems, we show hardness for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
i.e., for all approximate equilibria except exact equilibria (ǫ = 0), and trivial
approximations (ǫ = 1). All of these problems are contained in NP because a
“Yes” instance can be witnessed by a suitable approximate equilibrium (or two
in the case of Problem 5). The starting point for all of our hardness results is
the NP-complete problem Monotone 1-in-3 SAT.
3 Given probability distributions x and x′, the TV distance between them is
maxi{|xi − x
′
i|}. The TV distance between strategy profiles s = (s1, . . . , sn) and
s′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
n) is the maximum TV distance of si and s
′
i over all i.
Definition 1 (Monotone 1-in-3 SAT). Given a monotone boolean CNF for-
mula φ with exactly 3 distinct variables per clause, decide if there exists a sat-
isfying assignment in which exactly one variable in each clause is true. We call
such an assignment a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment.
Every formula φ, with variables V = {x1, . . . , xn} and clauses C = {y1, . . . , ym},
can be represented as a bipartite graph between V and C, with an edge between
xi and yj if and only if xi appears in clause yj. We assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that this graph is connected. We say that φ is planar if the corresponding
graph is planar. Recall that a graph is called cubic if the degree of every vertex
is exactly three. We use the following result of Moore and Robson [28].
Theorem 2 (Section 3.1 [28]). Monotone 1-in-3 SAT is NP-complete even
when the formula corresponds to a planar cubic graph.
From now on, we assume that φ is a monotone planar cubic formula. We say
that φ is a “Yes” instance if φ admits a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment.
Large total payoff for ǫ-NEs. Problem 1 asks whether there exists an ǫ-NE
with high social welfare. We show that this is NP-complete for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1],
even when the interaction graph for the polymatrix game is planar, bipartite,
cubic, and each player has at most three pure strategies.
Construction. Given a formula φ, we construct a polymatrix game G with
m+ n players as follows. For each variable xi we create a player vi and for each
clause yj we create a player cj . We now use V to denote the set of variable players
and C to denote the clause players. The interaction graph is the bipartite graph
between V and C described above. Each edge game has the same structure.
Every player in V has two pure strategies called True and False, while every
player in C has three pure strategies that depend on the three variables in the
clause. If clause yj contains variables xi, xk, xl, then player cj has pure strategies
i, k and l. The game played between vi and cj is shown on the left in Figure 1.
The bimatrix games for vk and vl are defined analogously.
Correctness. Observe that the constructed game is not normalised. We prove
our result for every possible ǫ, and thus in the normalised game the result will
hold for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Our goal is to show that, for every possible ǫ, there is
an ǫ-NE with social welfare m if and only if φ is a “Yes” instance. We begin by
showing that if there is a solution for φ, then there is an exact NE for G with
social welfare m, and therefore there is also an ǫ-NE for every possible ǫ with
social welfare m. We start with a simple observation about the maximum and
minimum payoffs that players can obtain in G.
Lemma 3. In G, the total payoff for every variable player is at most 0, and the
total payoff for every clause player cj is at most 1. Moreover, if cj gets payoff 1,
then cj and the variable players connected to cj play pure strategies.
Lemma 4. If φ is a “Yes” instance, there is an NE for G with social welfare m.
We now prove that if there is a strategy profile of G with social welfare m
then φ is a “Yes” instance. Clearly, if this statement holds for any strategy
profile, it also holds for all ǫ-NE for any ǫ.
❅
❅
Player cj
Player vi
i
k
l
True False
1 0
0 -1
−1 0
0 0
−1 0
0 0
❅
❅
Player cj
Player vi
i
k
l
Out
True False Out
κ c · κ 0
1
3
− ǫ
3
0 1
3
0 c · κ 0
0 1
3
− ǫ
3
1
3
0 c · κ 0
0 1
3
− ǫ
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 0 1
3
Fig. 1: Left: The game between clause player cj and variable player vi for Prob-
lem 1. Right: The game between cj and vi for Problems 2–9.
Lemma 5. If there is a strategy profile for G with social welfare m, then φ is a
“Yes” instance.
Together, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 show that for all possible values of ǫ, it is
NP-complete to decide whether there exists an ǫ-NE for G with social welfare m.
When we normalise the payoffs in [0, 1], this holds for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 6. Problem 1 is NP-complete for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1], even for degree-3 bipar-
tite planar polymatrix games in which each player has at most 3 pure strategies.
Hardness of Problems 2–9. To show the hardness Problems 2–9, we modify
the game constructed in the previous section. We use G′ to denote the new
polymatrix game. The interaction graph for G′ is exactly the same as for the
game G. The bimatrix games are extended by an extra pure strategy for each
player, the strategy Out, and the payoffs are adapted. If variable xi is in clause
yj , then the bimatrix game between clause player cj and vi is shown on the right
in Figure 1. To fix the constants, given ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we choose c to be in the range
(max(1 − 3ǫ2 , 0), 1), and we set κ =
1−ǫ
1+2c . Observe that 0 < c < 1, and that
κ+ 2c · κ = 1− ǫ. Furthermore, since c > 1− 3ǫ2 we have 0 < κ <
1
3 .
In the next lemma we prove that if φ is a “Yes” instance, then the strategy
profile in which all players play according to to the assignment is an ǫ-WSNE.
No player uses the strategy Out in this strategy profile.
Lemma 7. If φ is a “Yes” instance, then G′ possesses an ǫ-WSNE such that
no player uses strategy Out.
On the other hand, we can prove that if φ is a “No” instance, then in every
ǫ-WSNE of G′ all players play the pure strategy Out.
Lemma 8. If φ is a “No” instance, then G′ possesses a unique ǫ-WSNE where
every player plays Out.
The combination of these two properties allows us to show that Problems 2–5
are NP-complete. For example, for Problem 4, we can ask whether there is an
ǫ-WSNE of the game in which player one does not player Out.
Theorem 9. Problems 2–5 are NP-complete for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1), even on degree-3
planar bipartite polymatrix games where each player has at most 4 pure strategies.
Duplicating strategies. To show hardness for Problems 6–9, we slightly mod-
ify the game G′ by duplicating every pure strategy except Out for all of the
players. Since each player cj ∈ C has the pure strategies i, k, l and Out, we
give player cj pure strategies i
′, k′ and l′, which each have identical payoffs as
the original strategies. Similarly for each player vi ∈ V we add the pure strate-
gies True′ and False′. Let us denote the game with the duplicated strategies by
G˜. Then, if φ is a “Yes” instance, we can construct an ǫ-WSNE in which no
player plays Out, where each player places at most 0.5 probability on each pure
strategy, and where each player uses a support of size 2. These properties are
sufficient to show that Problems 6–9 are NP-complete.
Theorem 10. Problems 6–9 are NP-complete for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1), even on degree-3
planar bipartite polymatrix games where each player has at most 7 pure strategies.
4 Constrained equilibria in bounded treewidth games
In this section we show that some constrained equilibrium problems can be
solved in quasi-polynomial time if the input game has bounded treewidth and
at most logarithmically many actions per player. We first present a dynamic
programming algorithm for finding approximate Nash equilibria in these games,
and then show that it can be modified to find constrained equilibria.
Tree Decompositions. A tree decomposition of a graph G = (V,E) is a pair
(X , T ), where T = (I, F ) is a tree and X = {Xi|i ∈ I} is a family of subsets
of V such that (1)
⋃
i∈I Xi = V , (2) for every edge (u, v) ∈ E there exists an
i ∈ I such that {u, v} ∈ Xi, and (3) for all i, j, k ∈ I if j is on the path from
i to k in T , then Xi ∩ Xk ⊆ Xj . The width of a tree decomposition (X , T ) is
maxi |Xi| − 1. The treewidth of a graph is the minimum width over all possible
tree decompositions of the graph. In general, computing the treewidth of a graph
is NP-hard, but there are fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the problem.
In particular Bodlaender [7] has given an algorithm that runs in O(f(w) · n)
time, where w is the treewidth of the graph, and n is the number of nodes.
4.1 An algorithm to find approximate Nash equilibria
Let G be a polymatrix game and let (X , T ) be a tree decomposition of G’s
interaction graph. We assume that an arbitrary node of T has been chosen as
the root. Then, given some node v in T , we define G(Xv) to be the subgame
that is obtained when we only consider the players in the subtree of v. More
formally, this means that we only include players i that are contained in some
set Xu where u is in the subtree of v in the tree decomposition. Furthermore,
we will use G˜(Xv) to denote the players in G(Xv) \Xv. For every player i ∈ Xv,
we will use Ni(Xv) to denote the neighbours of i in G˜(Xv).
k-uniform strategies. A strategy s is said to be k-uniform if there exists a
multi-set S of k pure strategies such that s plays a uniformly over the pure strate-
gies in S. These strategies naturally arise when we sample, with replacement, k
pure strategies from a distribution, and play the sampled strategies uniformly.
The following is a theorem of [2].
Theorem 11. Every n-player m-action game has a k-uniform ǫ-NE whenever
k ≥ 8 · lnm+lnn−ln ǫ+ln 8
ǫ2
.
Candidates and witnesses. For each node v in the tree decomposition, we
compute a set of witnesses, where each witness corresponds to an ǫ-NE in G(Xv).
Our witnesses have two components: s provides a k-uniform strategy profile for
the players in Xv, while p contains information about the payoff that the players
in Xv obtain from the players in G˜(Xv). By summarising the information about
the players in G˜(Xv), we are able to keep the number of witnesses small.
There is one extra complication, however, which is that the number of pos-
sible payoff vectors that can be stored in p depends on the number of different
strategies for the players in G˜(Xv), which is exponential, and will cause our dy-
namic programming table to be too large. To resolve this, we round the entries
of p to a suitably small set of rounded payoffs.
Formally, we first define P = {x ∈ [0, 1] : x = ǫ2n · k for some k ∈ N}, to be
the set of rounded payoffs. Then, given a node v in the tree decomposition, we
say that a tuple (s,p) is a k-candidate if:
– s is a set of strategies of size |Xv|, which gives one strategy for each player
in Xv.
– Every strategy in s is k-uniform.
– p is a set of payoff vectors of size |Xv|. Each element pi ∈ p is of the form
Pm, and assigns a rounded payoff to each pure strategy of player i.
The set of candidates gives the set of possible entries that can appear in our dy-
namic programming table. Every witness is a candidate, but not every candidate
is a witness. The total number of k-candidates for each tree decomposition node
v can be derived as follows. Each player has mk possible k-uniform strategies,
and so there are mkw possibilities for s. We have that |P | = 2n
ǫ
, and that p con-
tains m ·w elements of P , so the total number of possibilities for p is (2 · n
ǫ
)mw.
Hence, the total number of candidates for v is mkw · (2 · n
ǫ
)mw.
Next, we define what it means for a candidate to be a witness. We say that
a k-candidate is an ǫ, k, r-witness if there exists a profile s′ for G(Xv) where
– s′ agrees with s for the players in Xv.
– Every player in G˜(Xv) is ǫ-happy, which means that no player in G˜(Xv) can
increase their payoff by more than ǫ by unilaterally deviating from s′. Note
that this does not apply to the players in Xv.
– Each payoff vector p ∈ p is within r of the payoff that player i obtains from
the players in G˜(Xv). More accurately, for every pure strategy l of player i
we have that: ‖ pl−
∑
j∈G˜(Xv)
(Aij · s′j)l ‖ ≤ r. Note that p does not capture
the payoff obtained from players in Xv, only those in the subtree of v.
The algorithm. Our algorithm computes a set of witnesses for each tree de-
composition node by dynamic programming. At every leaf, the algorithm checks
every possible candidate to check whether it is a witness. At internal nodes in
the tree decomposition, if a vertex is forgotten, that is, if it appears in a child of
a node, but not in the node itself, then we use the set of witnesses computed for
the child to check whether the forgotten node is ǫ-happy. If this is the case, then
we create a corresponding witness for the parent node. The complication here is
that, since we use rounded payoff vectors, this check may declare that a player
is ǫ-happy erroneously due to rounding errors. So, during the analysis we must
be careful to track the total amount of rounding error that can be introduced.
Once a set of witnesses has been computed for every tree decomposition node,
a second phase is then used to find an ǫ-NE of the game. This phase picks an
arbitrary witness in the root node, and then unrolls it by walking down the tree
decomposition and finding the witnesses that were used to generate it. These
witnesses collectively assign a k-uniform strategy profile to each player, and this
strategy profile will be the ǫ-NE that we are looking for.
Due to space constraints, we do not give a full description of the algorithm
here, but we give a complete specification in Appendix H. The following lemma
summarises the key properties of the algorithm.
Lemma 12. There is a dynamic programming algorithm that runs in time O(n ·
m2kw · (n
ǫ
)2mw) that, for each tree decomposition node v, computes a set of can-
didates C(v) such that:
– Every candidate (s,p) ∈ C(v) is an ǫv, k, rv-witness for v for some ǫv ≤ 1.5ǫ
and rv ≤
ǫ
4
– If s is a k-uniform ǫ/4-NE then C(v) will contain a witness (s′,p) such that
s′ agrees with s for all players in Xv.
The running time bound arises from the total number of possible candidates
for each tree decomposition node. The first property ensures that the algorithm
always produces a 1.5ǫ-NE of the game, provided that the root node contains a
witness. The second property ensures that the root node will contain a witness
provided that game has a k-uniform ǫ/4-NE. Theorem 11 tells us how large k
needs to be for this to be the case. These facts yields the following theorem.
Theorem 13. Let ǫ > 0, G be a polymatrix game with treewidth w, and k =
128 · lnm+lnn−ln ǫ+ln 8
ǫ2
. There is an algorithm that finds a 1.5ǫ-NE of G in in
O(n ·m2kw + (n
ǫ
)2mw) time.
Note that if m ≤ lnn (and in particular if m is constant), this is a QPTAS.
Corollary 14. Let ǫ > 0, and G be a polymatrix game with treewidth w, and
m ≤ lnn. There is an algorithm that finds a 1.5ǫ-NE of G in (n
ǫ
)O(
w·lnn
ǫ2
) time.
4.2 Constrained approximate Nash equilibria
One variable decomposable constraints. We now adapt the algorithm to
find a certain class of constrained approximate Nash equilibria. As a motivating
example, consider Problem 1, which asks us to find an approximate NE with high
social welfare. Formally, this constraint assigns a single rational number (the
social welfare) to each strategy profile, and asks us to maximize this number.
This constraint also satisfies a decomposability property: if a game G consists of
two subgames G1 and G2, and if there are no edges between these two subgames,
then we can maximize social welfare in G by maximizing social welfare in G1 and
G2 independently. We formalise this by defining a constraint to be one variable
decomposable (OVD) if the following conditions hold.
– There is a polynomial-time computable function g such that maps every
strategy profile in G to a rational number.
– Let s be a strategy for game G, and suppose that we want to add vertex v
to G. Let s be a strategy choice for v, and s′ be an extension of s that
assigns s to v. There is a polynomial-time computable function add such
that g(s′) = add(G, v, s, g(s)).
– Let G1 and G2 be two subgames that partition G, and suppose that there
are no edges between G1 and G2. Let s1 be a strategy profile in G1 and s2
be a strategy profile in G2. If s is the strategy profile for G that corresponds
to merging s1 and s2, then there is a polynomial-time computable function
merge such that g(s) = merge(G1, G2, g(s1), g(s2)).
Intuitively, the second condition allows us to add a new vertex to a subgame, and
the third condition allows us to merge two disconnected subgames. Moreover,
observe that the functions add and merge depend only on the value that g assigns
to strategies, and not the strategies themselves. This allows our algorithm to only
store the value assigned by g, and forget the strategies themselves.
Examples of OVD constraints. Many of the problems in Table 1 are OVD
constraints. Problems 1 and 2 refer to the total payoff of the strategy profile, and
so g is defined to be the total payoff of all players, while the functions add and
merge simply add the total payoff of the two strategy profiles. Problems 3 and 6
both deal with minimizing a quantity associated with a strategy profile, so for
these problems the functions add and merge use the min function to minimize the
relevant quantities. Likewise, Problems 7, 8, and 9 seek to maximize a quantity,
and so the functions add and merge use the max function. In all cases, proving
the required properties for the functions is straightforward.
Finding OVD k-uniform constrained equilibria. We now show that, for
every OVD constraint, the algorithm presented in Section 4.1 can be modified to
find a k-uniform 1.5ǫ-NE that also has a high value with respect to the constraint.
More formally, we show that the value assigned by g to the 1.5ǫ-NE is greater
than the value assigned to g to all k-uniform ǫ/4-NE in the game.
Given an OVD constraint defined by g, add, and merge, we add an extra ele-
ment to each candidate to track the variable from the constraint: each candidate
has the form (s,p, x), where s and p are as before, and x is a rational number.
The definition of an ǫ, k, r, g-witness is extended by adding the condition:
– Recall that s′ is a strategy profile for G(Xv) whose existence is asserted by
the witness. Let s′′ be the restriction of s′ to G˜(Xv). We have x = g(s
′′).
We then modify the algorithm to account for this new element in the witness.
At each stage we track the value correct value for x. At the leafs, we use g to
compute the correct value. At internal nodes, we use add and merge to compute
the correct value using the values stored in the witnesses of the children.
If at any point two witnesses are created that agree on the s and p compo-
nents, but disagree on the x component, then we only keep the witness whose x
value is higher. This ensures that we only keep witnesses corresponding to strat-
egy profiles that maximize the constraint. When we reach the root, we choose
the strategy profile with maximal value for x to be unrolled in phase 2. The fact
that we only keep one witness for each pair s and p means that the running time
of the algorithm is unchanged. Again, we defer the technical description of the
algorithm to Appendix I, but the following theorem summarises the results.
Theorem 15. For every ǫ > 0 let k = 128 · lnm+lnn−ln ǫ+ln 8
ǫ2
. If G is a polyma-
trix game with treewidth w, then there is an algorithm that runs in O(n ·m2kw+
(n
ǫ
)2mw) time and finds a k-uniform 1.5ǫ-NE s such that g(s) ≥ g(s′) for every
strategy profile s′ that is an ǫ/4-NE.
Results for non-k-uniform strategies. The guarantee given by Theorem 15
is given relative to the best value achievable by a k-uniform ǫ/4-NE. It is also
interesting to ask whether we can drop the k-uniform constraint. In the following
theorem, we show that if g is defined to be a linear function of the payoffs in
the game, then a guarantee can be given relative to every ǫ/8-NE of the game.
Note that this covers Problems 1, 2, and 3.
Theorem 16. Suppose that, for a given a OVD constraint, the function g is a
linear function of the payoffs. Let s be the 1.5ǫ-NE found by our algorithm when
For every ǫ/8-NE s′ we have that g(s) ≥ g(s′)−O(ǫ).
5 Further work
There are two clear directions for further work: Can we extend NP-hardness of
Problems 2–9 to ǫ-NE? We believe hardness will not hold for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1) as for
our results, but will hold for all ǫ less than a constant. Secondly, can we extend
the family of constraints for which we can efficiently find constrained approxi-
mate equilibria that compare well with all other (non-k-uniform) approximate
equilibria, beyond the constraints we can already deal with?
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A Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. That every variable player gets at most 0 in total follows from the fact
that the largest payoff entry for the variable player in the bimatrix games is 0.
Now consider a clause player cj that interacts with variable players i, k and l.
Denote by pi, pk and pl the probabilities that player i, k and l play the pure
strategy True respectively. Pure strategy i yields payoff pi−pl−pk for player cj , l
yields payoff−pi+pl−pk, and k yields payoff−pi−pl+pk. Since pi, pk, pl ∈ [0, 1],
the maximum value for each expression is 1. Moreover, the maximum value of 1
is achieved only when exactly one of the variable players plays his pure strategy
True with probability 1 and the other two players play their pure strategy False,
and thus at most one of these expressions if 1, so the clause player must player
a pure strategy to get 1 in total. ⊓⊔
B Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. A 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for φ directly corresponds to a pure strat-
egy profile for G: variable player vi ∈ V plays the truth value of xi; clause
player cj ∈ C plays the pure strategy that corresponds to the single true mem-
ber variable of yj . We call such a strategy profile s. We prove that s is an NE
for G and that its social welfare is m.
First, we show that s is an NE. Observe that each player in C gets payoff 1
under s. Since, by Lemma 3, this is best payoff that a clause player can obtain, no
player from C has a reason to deviate. Now consider a variable player vi ∈ V . If vi
plays the pure strategy True, then he gets a total payoff of 0 irrespective of what
the clause players do. On the other hand, if player vi plays the pure strategy
False in s, then he gets payoff 0 from every bimatrix game he participates in
because clause players only play strategy i if vi plays True. Thus, in either case,
player vi cannot gain by deviating, since, by Lemma 3, 0 is the largest payoff
that vi can obtain.
Finally, observe that the social welfare of the strategy profile is m, because as
we have argued, every clause player gets 1 and every variable player gets 0. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose that there is a strategy profile s with social welfare m. By
Lemma 3, in order to achieve social welfare m, every clause player must get
payoff 1, and this is only possible under pure strategy profiles. So, s is a pure
strategy profile, and naturally defines an assignment to the variables in φ ac-
cording to the pure strategies played by the variable players. We argue that this
is a satisfying 1-in-3 assignment of φ. The reason is that, when clause player cj
plays strategy i, variable player vi must pick True, and the other two players
must pick False, because otherwise cj would not obtain payoff 1. Since this holds
for all clauses, and every clause gets payoff 1, every clause must have exactly
one true literal. ⊓⊔
D Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. In exactly the same way as in the proof of Lemma 4, we interpret an 1-in-3
satisfying assignment for φ as a pure strategy profile s for G. We must argue
that such an s is an ǫ-WSNE. Under s, every clause player gets payoff κ+ 2c · κ;
he gets κ from the game he plays with the player that plays the pure strategy
True and c · κ from each of the two games he plays with the players that play
the pure strategy False. The expected payoff from Out is 1 (because every clause
player has degree exactly 3). Thus, every clause player plays a pure strategy that
is a (1 − κ− 2c · κ)-best response, which is an ǫ-best response by the choice of
κ and c. Under s, every variable player vi gets payoff 1 − ǫ since vi plays three
bimatrix games with clause players that either all play i if vi plays True or none
of them play i if vi plays False. The maximum payoff that vi could get is 1 from
pure strategy Out. Thus, every variable player plays a pure strategy that is a
ǫ-best response. Hence, the constructed strategy profile is a ǫ-WSNE. ⊓⊔
E Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Assume that φ is a “No” instance. We show that in this case in every
ǫ-WSNE there is at least one player who plays Out as a pure strategy. Towards
a contradiction, assume that no clause player plays Out, and consider a clause
player cj , who is connected to i, k, and l. The maximum payoff that cj can get
is κ+2c ·κ = 1− ǫ, if and only if exactly one of vi, vk, and vl plays True and the
other two play False. If every clause player could achieve payoff 1− ǫ, we would
then have an 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for φ, which would be a contradiction.
Thus at least one clause player, say cj , gets payoff less than 1− ǫ. However, if cj
has payoff strictly less than 1 − ǫ and does not play Out, then we do not have
an ǫ-WSNE, since Out always gives cj payoff 1.
Having established that in any ǫ-WSNE there exists at least one player cj ∈ C
that plays Out as a pure strategy, we now prove that all other players must also
play Out as a pure strategy. There are two cases to consider.
– Let vi be a variable player, cj be a clause player who has an edge to vi,
and suppose that cj plays Out as a pure strategy. Observe that, if vi plays
either True or False, his payoff can be at most 23 −
2ǫ
3 , whereas he can always
obtain payoff 1 from playing Out, since at least one of his neighbours plays
Out by assumption. So vi must play Out as a pure strategy in order to be
in a ǫ-WSNE.
– Let vi be a variable player, cj be a clause player who has an edge to vi, and
suppose that vi plays Out as a pure strategy. Observe that if this is the case,
then cj cannot obtain payoff κ+2c ·κ = 1− ǫ from the strategies i, j, and k.
On the other hand, cj obtains payoff 1 from Out under all strategies profiles,
and so cj must play Out as a pure strategy in order to be in a ǫ-WSNE.
By iteratively applying these two arguments we can prove that, since there is at
least one player playing Out, all other players must also play Out. Hence, the
strategy profile in which every player plays Out is the unique ǫ-WSNE of the
game. ⊓⊔
F Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. From Lemmas 7 and 8 we can get the following two facts about G′. If φ
is a “Yes” instance, then G′ possesses an ǫ-WSNE such that:
(a) no player plays the pure strategy Out,
(b) every player gets payoff 1− ǫ.
If φ is a “No” instance, then for every ǫ-WSNE of G′ we have that:
(i) every player places all probability on the strategy Out,
(ii) every player gets payoff 1.
We will use these properties to show that each of the problems is NP-complete.
Problem 2 is NP-complete because of (b) with (ii) when we set u = (m+n)·(1−
ǫ), where n and m are the number of variables and clauses in φ respectively.
This is because, if φ is a “Yes” instance, from (b) we get that there exists an
ǫ-WSNE where the sum of players payoffs sums up to u, while if φ is a “No”
instance, then in the unique ǫ-WSNE of the game the players’ payoffs sum
up to n+m.
Problem 3 with u = 1− ǫ is also NP-complete because of (b) and (ii).
Problem 4 is NP-complete because of (a) and (i). We focus on a variable player
and set S = {True,False}. If φ is a “Yes” instance, then from (a) there is
an ǫ-WSNE where the variable player plays strategies only from S. If φ is a
“No” instance, then from (i) in the unique ǫ-WSNE the variable player must
play Out.
Problem 5 is NP-complete because of (a) and (i) when we set d = 1. Observe
that the strategy profile where every player plays his pure strategy Out is an
exact NE, so it is an ǫ-WSNE irrespective of whether φ is a “Yes” or “No”
instance. So, from (a) we know that when φ is a “Yes” instance, there is
another ǫ-WSNE where no player plays his pure strategy Out, and there are
two WSNEs with TV distance 1. On the other hand, if φ is a “No” instance,
the “all Out” strategy profile is the unique ǫ-WNSE.
⊓⊔
G Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. Lemma 7 holds also for the game G˜, since it differs from G′ only in the
duplication of pure strategies other than Out. Extending the claim of Lemma 7,
we have that if φ is a “Yes” instance, then there is a ǫ-WSNE in G˜ in which
no player places probability on Out, and in which the amount of probability on
each pair of duplicate strategies is split evenly, i.e., probability one half on each,
and |supp(sj)| = 2 for every player j of the game. If φ is a “No” instance, then
for every ǫ-WSNE of G˜ every player places all probability on the strategy Out,
so |supp(sj)| = 1 for every player j of the game.
These properties then imply that our problems are NP-complete.
Problem 6 is NP-complete when we set p = 12 .
Problem 7 is NP-complete when we set k = 2(n+m), where n and m are the
number of variables and clauses in φ respectively. If φ is a “Yes” instance,
then there is an ǫ-WSNE where the support sizes of the played strategies
sum up to k. If on the other hand the instance does not have a solution, then
in the unique ǫ-WSNE of the game the support sizes sum up to m+ n < k.
Problem 8 is NP-complete when we set k = 2.
Problem 9 is NP-complete when we set k = 2.
⊓⊔
H Proof of Lemma 12
In this section, we fully describe the dynamic programming algorithm that we
referred to in Section 4.1. The algorithm will proceed in two phases. Phase 1 will
compute a set of candidates for each node in the tree decomposition, by starting
at the leafs and working upwards. Phase 2 will then use these sets to compute
an approximate Nash equilibrium of the game.
Nice tree decompositions. It has been shown that we can restrict ourselves
to only considering nice tree decompositions [25]. A tree decomposition (X , T )
is nice if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. every node of T has at most two children,
2. if a node i has two children j and k, then Xi = Xj = Xk,
3. if a node i has one child j, then
– either |Xi| = |Xj |+ 1 and Xj ⊆ Xi
– or |Xi| = |Xj| − 1 and Xi ⊆ Xj.
In a nice tree decomposition, T is a rooted binary tree, and each node i has one
of the following types.
– Start. The node i is a leaf in T .
– Join. The node i has exactly two children j and k in T , and Xi = Xj = Xk.
– Introduce. The node i has exactly one child j in T and |Xi| = |Xj | + 1.
That is, exactly one new vertex is added as we move from j to i.
– Forget. The node i has exactly one child j in T and |Xi| = |Xj | − 1. That
is, exactly one vertex is removed as we move from j to i.
It is a well known fact (see, e.g., [25]) that if we have a tree decomposition of
width w for a given graph, then we can construct a nice tree decomposition of
width w in polynomial time. Furthermore, if the original tree decomposition had
n nodes, then the nice tree decomposition will have at most 4n nodes. When we
are working with nice tree decompositions, we can assume that if r is the root
of the tree, then Xr = ∅, since we can keep adding forget nodes to make this the
case. We will assume from now on that our tree decomposition is nice.
Phase 1. The first phase of the algorithm will compute a set of k-candidates
C(v) for each tree decomposition node v. We will later prove that C(v) is in fact
a set of witnesses. Since we work with nice tree decompositions, we only need to
consider four types of nodes:
Start. If v is a start node, then we produce C(v) by listing all possible k-uniform
strategy profiles for the players in Xv, and for each combination producing a
candidate (s,p) where s plays the strategies, and p assigns payoff 0 to every
pure strategy. This can be done in O(mkw) time.
Introduce. If v is an introduce node, then let u be the child of v in T . We consider
every k-uniform strategy si of player i, and every (s,p) ∈ C(u), and for each
pair we produce (s′,p′) where:
– s′i = si, and s
′
j = sj for all j 6= i,
– p′i is the 0 vector and pj = pj for j 6= i,
and we add (s′,p′) to C(v). This operation takes O(mk · |C(u)|) time.
Forget. If v is a forget node, then let u be the child of v in T . Let i be the player
who is removed by v. For each (s,p) ∈ C(u) we perform the following operation.
First we check that player i is ǫ-happy, which is true if the following inequality
holds:
si ·
(
pi +
∑
j∈Xv∩N(i)
sj∈s
Aij · sj
)
≥ max
(
pi +
∑
j∈Xv∩N(i)
sj∈s
Aij · sj
)
− ǫ. (1)
This inequality simply checks whether player i is ǫ-happy, using the data about
player i’s payoff stored in p, and the strategies chosen by the other players in
Xv, using the data stored in s.
If the test is passed, then we create (s′,p′) as follows:
– For all j 6= i we set s′(j) = s(j).
– For all j 6= i we obtain p′(j) by computing p(j)+Aji ·si, and then rounding
it to the closest element of P .
This operation discards the strategy and payoff vector for player i, and updates
the payoff vectors for the players in Xv using the strategy played by player i in
s. We then add (s′,p′) to C(v). This operation takes O(|C(u)|) time.
Join. Finally, if v is a join node, then let u1 and u2 be the two children of v in T .
We consider every pair of candidates (su1 ,pu1) ∈ C(u1) and (su2 ,pu2) ∈ C(u2).
For each pair, we first check that su1 and su2 are the same, and if so we create
(s′,p′) as follows:
– s′(i) = su1(i) = su2(i) for all i ∈ Xv.
– p′(i) = pu1(i) + pu2(i) for all i ∈ Xv.
This operation copies the strategy profile, and adds the two payoff vectors. Note
that no rounding is required, since pu1(i) and pu2(i) are both already rounded.
This operation takes O(|C(u1)| · |C(u2)|) time.
Running time. As we have argued, the total number of candidates for each
tree decomposition node can be at most mkw · (n
ǫ
)mw. Since there are O(n)
nodes in our tree decomposition, the overall running time of the algorithm is
O(n ·m2kw · (n
ǫ
)2mw).
Correctness. We first prove that every candidate computed by the algorithm
is a witness. For each node v in the tree decomposition, let f(v) be the total
number of forget nodes over all paths from v to a leaf (including v itself if it is
a forget node).
Lemma 17. For every node v in the tree decomposition, let rv =
ǫ·f(v)
4n and
ǫv = ǫ+ 2 · rv. Every candidate (s,p) ∈ C(v) is an ǫv, k, rv-witness for v.
Proof. Our proof will be by induction over the nodes in the tree decomposition.
For the base case, we consider the case where v is a start node. In this case,
observe that the game G˜(Xv) is empty, so a k-candidate (s,p) is an ǫv, k, rv-
witness if and only if s contains only k-uniform strategies, and p contains only
0 vectors. Since C(v) only contains candidates that satisfy these criteria, every
member of C(v) is an ǫv, k, rv-witness.
For the inductive step, there are three possibilities, depending on the type
of v. In each of these cases, we assume, as inductive hypothesis, that we have
proved that every member of C(u) is an ǫu, k, ru-witness for all children u of v.
Introduce nodes. Let v be an introduce node, and let (s,p) ∈ C(u) be a witness
for u. We will show that the candidate (s′,p′) created by our algorithm is an
ǫu, k, ru-witness for v. Observe that, since Xu is a separator in G, player i has
no edges to any player in G˜(Xv). This means that the strategy played by player
i cannot affect whether any player in G˜(Xv) is happy. Therefore, we can use
the inductive hypothesis to show that every player in G˜(Xv) is ǫu-happy, and
then observe that ǫu = ǫv. Moreover, player i cannot obtain any payoff from the
players in G˜(Xv), and so setting pi to be the all-zero vector is correct. Thus,
(s′,p′) is an ǫv, k, rv-witness for v.
Forget nodes. We now consider the case where v is a forget node. Let (s,p) be
a member of C(u) that passes the test in Inequality (1). Let sf be the strategy
profile for G˜(Xu) in which every player is ǫu-happy, whose existence is witnessed
by (s,p). We argue that if we add si ∈ s to sf , then we obtain a strategy profile
for G˜(Xv) in which every player is ǫv happy:
– Every player other than i continues to be ǫu-happy, because by definition sf
agrees with si. Since ǫu < ǫv, these players are also ǫv-happy.
– On the other hand, we must explicitly prove that player i is ǫv-happy. By
the inductive hypothesis, the payoffs stored in p are within rv of the true
payoff to player i under sf . Thus, in the worst case, Inequality (1) ensures
that:
si ·
( ∑
j∈G(Xv)∩N(i)
sj∈sf
Aij · sj
)
+ rv ≥ max
(
pi+
∑
j∈G(Xv)∩N(i)
sj∈sf
Aij · sj
)
− rv − ǫ.
This implies that player i is (ǫ+ 2rv)-happy, as required.
Next we argue that p′, the new payoff vector constructed by our algorithm,
is correct. Consider a player j ∈ Xv. By the inductive hypothesis, pj gives the
payoff to j from the players in G˜(Xu) with an additive error of ru. We add
Aji · si to this vector, obtaining the payoff to j from the players in G˜(Xv) with
an additive error of ru. We then round to the closest element of P , which adds an
additional error of at most ǫ/4n. Since rv = ru + ǫ/4n, this operation is correct.
Thus, we have shown that (s′,p′) is an ǫv, k, rv-witness for v.
Join nodes. Finally, we consider the case where v is a join node. Let (su1 ,pu1) ∈
C(u1) and (su2 ,pu2) ∈ C(u2) be a pair of candidates. Observe that, since Xv
separates G˜(Xu1) and G˜(Xu2), no player in G˜(Xu1) can influence a player in
G˜(Xu2), and vice versa. Therefore, when we merge these two witnesses in (s
′,p′),
we do not affect whether any player in G˜(Xv) is ǫ-happy. Furthermore, when we
add pu1(i), which has an additive error of ru1 , to pu2(i), which has an additive
error of ru2 , then we obtain a vector that has an additive error of ru1 + ru2 .
Since rv depends on the total number of forget nodes in both subtrees of v, the
resulting payoff vector has an additive error of rv. So, we have shown that (s
′,p′)
is an ǫv, k, rv-witness for v. ⊓⊔
In the other direction we must also show that the algorithm does not throw
away too many witnesses. We do this in the following lemma.
Lemma 18. If s is a k-uniform ǫ/4-NE then C(v) will contain a witness (s′,p)
such that s′ agrees with s for the vertex in Xv.
Proof. We will show, by induction, the stronger property that every tree node v
will have a witness (s,p) where:
– For every player i ∈ Xv we have si ∈ s is the same as the strategy assigned
to player i by sNE.
– The payoffs in p are within rv =
ǫ·f(v)
4n of the true values given by t
NE
v =∑
j∈G˜(Xv)
Aij · (sNE)j .
For the base case, where v is a start node, observe that by assumption s only
uses k-uniform strategies, and so C(v) will contain a candidate satisfying the
required properties. For the inductive step, we again have three possibilities,
depending on the type of v.
If v is a introduce node, then let (s,p) be the candidate for u whose exis-
tence is implied by the inductive hypothesis. Let (s′,p′) be the witness that the
algorithm creates using (s,p) and (sNE)i. Since Xu separates i from every player
in G˜(Xv), we have that t
NE
u = t
NE
v for all players i 6= j, and t
NE
v assigns the 0
vector to player i. Since, by the inductive hypothesis, we have that p close to
tNEu with an additive error of at most ru = rv, the witness (s
′,p′) created by our
algorithm does indeed satisfy the required properties.
If v is a forget node, then let (s,p) be the candidate for u whose existence
is implied by the inductive hypothesis. We begin by arguing that (s,p) is not
discarded by the check from Inequality (1). Since sNE is a
ǫ
4 -NE we have:
si ·
(
tNEi +
∑
j∈Xv∩N(i)
sj∈s
Aij · sj
)
≥ max
(
tNEi +
∑
j∈Xv∩N(i)
sj∈s
Aij · sj
)
−
ǫ
4
.
By the inductive hypothesis, we have that p is within tNEu with an additive
error of ru. Observe that, since there are at most n forget nodes in the tree
decomposition, we have ru ≤ n ·
ǫ·f(v)
4n ≤
ǫ
4 . Hence, we have:
si ·
(
pi +
∑
j∈Xv∩N(i)
sj∈s
Aij · sj
)
≥ max
(
pi +
∑
∈Xv∩N(i)
sj∈s
Aij · sj
)
−
ǫ
4
− 2 ·
ǫ
4
.
Thus, Inequality (1) is satisfied and so (s,p) will not be discarded.
We must still show that the vector p′ constructed by the algorithm satisfies
the requirements. Again, by the inductive hypothesis we have that p is within
tNEu with an additive error of ru. We also have that (t
NE
v )j = (t
NE
u )j + Aji · si
for all players j. Our algorithm does the same operation, but we must account
for the extra rounding step, which can add an additional error of at most ǫ/4n.
Since rv = ru + ǫ/4n, the resulting candidate satisfies the required properties.
If v is a join node, then let (su1,pu1) and (su2,pu2) be the two candidates
whose existence is implied by the inductive hypothesis. We argue that the can-
didate (s′,p′) produced by the algorithm from these two candidates will satisfy
the requirements. The first property is obviously true. For the property regard-
ing p′, observe that we add a payoff vector with additive error ru1 to a payoff
vector with additive error ru2, and so the resulting error will be ru1 + ru2. Since
f(v) = f(u1) + f(u2), the required property is satisfied. ⊓⊔
Let r be the root node of T . As we explained, we can assume that Xr is the
empty set, and so contains no players. Thus, C(r) is either empty, or it contains
a single witness (a pair of empty sets). The previous lemma implies that if the
game contains a k-uniform ǫ/4-NE, then C(r) will not be empty, which will allow
us to proceed to phase 2.
Phase 2. In phase 2, we assume that C(r) contains a candidate, and we will
use this candidate to find an approximate NE for the game. By Lemma 17 we
know that if the C(r) contains a candidate, then that candidate witnesses the
existence of an (ǫ + 2rr)-NE, where rr =
ǫ·f(r)
4n . Since f(r) ≤ n we have that
there exists an 1.5ǫ-NE in the game, and the goal of phase 2 is to find one.
The algorithm is straightforward. It walks down all branches of the tree
starting at the root. In each step, it has a candidate for the current vertex,
and needs to find corresponding candidates for each child of that node. More
precisely, if v is a node and (s,p) is the candidate that has been chosen for that
node (where the sole element of C(r) is chosen for the root initially), then the
algorithm does the following:
– If v is a join node with two children u1 and u2, then the algorithm finds the
candidates (su1 ,pu1) ∈ C(u1) and candidates (su2 ,pu2) ∈ C(u2) that were
used to generate (s,p) in phase 1, and then continues recursively on both u1
and u2.
– v is a forget node or an introduce node, and u is the child of v then the
algorithm finds the candidate (s′,p′) that was used to generate (s,p) and
continues recursively on u. If v is a forget node, and player i is forgotten at
v, then once we have found (s′,p′), we assign the strategy s′i to player i.
– If v is a start node, then algorithm stops.
Each of these steps can be carried out by re-running the phase 1 algorithm at
each node to determine how (s,p) was created, so the running time of phase 2
is no more than the running time of phase 1.
After the algorithm terminates each player has been assigned a strategy, and
we claim that the resulting strategy profile s is an 1.5ǫ-NE. This follows from
the fact that when we assign strategy si to player i in the forget node v, the test
from Inequality (1) ensures that player i is ǫ-happy with respect to the payoff
vector p, and the algorithm subsequently constructs a strategy profile whose
payoffs are within rv <
ǫ
2 of p, so player i is 1.5ǫ-happy in the resulting strategy
profile.
I Proof of Theorem 15
With reference to the algorithm defined in Appendix H, we make the following
modifications.
– At every Start node, the value of x is initialized to g(s∅), where s∅ denotes
the strategy profile of an empty game.
– When we create a witness for an Introduce node v with child u, we copy the
value for x given in the witness for u.
– When we create a witness for a Forget node v with child u, we set the value
of x by computing add(G˜(Xu), i, si, x), where i is the player that is being
forgotten, si is the strategy for i, and x is the value from the witness for u.
– When we create a witness for a Join node v with children u1 and u2, we set
the value of x by computing merge(G˜(Xu1), G˜(Xu2), x1, x2), where x1 and
x2 are the values from the witnesses for u1 and u2, respectively.
Observe that the definition of the functions add and merge ensure that x does
indeed capture the value that g would assign to the witnessed strategy profile
on G˜(Xv).
If at any point two witnesses are created that agree on the s and p com-
ponents, but disagree on the x component, then we keep the witness whose x
value is higher, and discard the other one. This ensures that the number of pos-
sible witnesses computed for each tree decomposition node does not increase
relative to the original algorithm, so the running time of the algorithm remains
unchanged (ignoring the extra polynomial factors needed to compute g, add,
and merge during the algorithm.)
Phase two of the algorithm is unchanged. We simply select the (unique)
witness (s,p, x) ∈ C(r) and unroll it to obtain a strategy profile s′ for G. The
properties of add and merge ensure that g(s′) = x.
We can now proceed to prove Theorem 15.
Proof. Since the modifications to the algorithm only deal with the extra parame-
ter x, every witness (s,p, x) computed by the algorithm corresponds to a witness
(s,p) that would have been computed by the original algorithm. Hence, the fact
that the algorithm finds an 1.5ǫ-NE follows immediately from Theorem 13.
For the second property, we will use Lemma 18. This lemma proves that for
every ǫ/4-NE s′ of the game, every tree decomposition node will have a witness
that corresponds to s′. The value of x for this witness will correspond to the value
that g would assign to the restriction of s′ to G˜(Xv). Since the algorithm always
discards witnesses with smaller values of x, this ensures that the approximate
equilibrium s must have g(s) ≥ g(s′).
J Proof of Theorem 16
Proof. The proof of this theorem requires a deeper understanding of the tech-
niques used to prove Theorem 11. They show that, when k is chosen according
to the required bound, one can take any strategy profile s′ and randomly sample
a k-uniform strategy profile s. The crucial property is that, with high proba-
bility, the payoff of each pure strategy under s′ are close to the payoff of the
corresponding pure strategy under s. In particular, the value of k used in our
algorithm ensures that the payoffs can move by at most ǫ/16. This, in turn,
means that any linear function over the payoffs can change by at most cǫ/16, for
some constant c, which gives the required inequality. ⊓⊔
